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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
16218

STEVEN M. JOHNS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted by a jury of one count
of aggravated kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-302 (1) (b)

(1953), as amended, and two counts of

aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii)

(1953), as amended.

The case was tried

in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge,
presiding.

Appellant now appeals from a verdict and

judgment of guilty rendered on November 28, 1978.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping and
two
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verdict, appellant was sententenced to a term of five years
to life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict
and judgment of guilty rendered in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 12th day of October, 1977, the
appellant and his girlfriend, Joyce Johnson, were at
the Mountaineer Club in Wellington, Utah.

They were

both drunk, as they had been drinking for several hours
(T.9,10,133).

The appellant was "fooling around all

over," playing with Ms. Johnson's breast, "rubbing all
over her chest and playing around with her stomach."
(T.lO).

Sometime between 7:00 and 8:00p.m., Hs. Johnson

asked the prosecutrix, Gloria Dix, if she (Gloria Dix)
would agree to take her (Joyce Johnson) to her home in
Woodside in return for filling Gloria's truck with gas
(T.ll,20,21).

The prosecutrix agreed, driving her truck

around to the side of the Mountaineer Club, where Ms.
Johnson "loaded" the appellant into the truck (T.21).
Appellant was passed out and had been sleeping due to
his high state of inebriation (T.21,120,138-139).

While

the appellant was being put in the truck, the prosecutrix
went to buy a case of beer at Joyce Johnson's request
(T.21,49,123).

The prosecutrix was not drinking at the

time nor had she partaken of any alcohol or drugs that
day (T.l5,21,46).
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The three then proceeded to Mr. Johnson's
aunt's house, where Ms. Johnson and the appellant had
a few more beers (T.21,123-124).

The prosecutrix,

noticing that Ms. Johnson and the appellant were "getting
pretty loose" and "kind of getting loud,'' "flopping all
over and stuff," told them that she had to be getting
back to the Mountaineer Club so that she could talk
with her former husband regarding a reconciliation
of their marriage (T.21-22,109-110).
Leaving Ms. Johnson's aunt's house, the
prosecutrix and her traveling companions began driving
towards Woodside (T.22,124).

Upon arriving at Ms.

Johnson's home in Woodside, it became evident that
her mother did not want the appellant to spend the
night at her home (T.23).

The appellant then asked

the prosecutrix if she would mind giving him a ride
back to Wellington (T.23), to which she replied that
she would take him as far as the Mountaineer Club (T.23).
The two departed for Wellington, and after
having traveled approximately one-quarter to one-half
mile, appellant threw his arm around the prosecutrix
(T.24,140-141).

She "threw his arm off" and told

him that "Danny (her ex-husband) would kill him for
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less than that"

(T.24,141).

Appellant then slid away

from her and pulled a knife with a blade approximately
eight to ten inches long, pushing it against her
throat (T.24). 1

(Appellant, at trial, admitted pulling

out a knife, but denied putting it against her throat
(T.l41).)

He then told her to pull the truck over.

She

replied that she had to find a better place to pull
over, whereupon he pushed the knife harder against her
throat, demanding that she pull over "Right now."
(T.24).

She pulled the truck over and they changed

places (T.24).

He very threateningly demanded at the

point of a knife that the prosecutrix take all her
clothes off (T.25).

She told him to put the knife

away, but he responded by telling her to get her
clothes off and not to say another word (T.25).

The

prosecutrix testified she did not fight back at the
appellant because the knife was at her throat (T.52).
She further stated that he kept trying to touch her
all over, including her private parts (T.25).

As he

took off driving, he told her to "shut up and just do what
I tell you."

(T.26).

He continually touched here, asking

her at one point, "Have you ever been fucked in the ass."
(T.26).

1

She then questioned the appellant in a pleading

The prosecutrix received a small cut from the knife on

her
The
cut
bled provided
enough
to ofform
a Library
scab,
which
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manner as to why he was doing this to her and asked what
had she ever done to him (T.26,27).

She testified at

trial that she was "waiting for a chance to make a break
and get to the door"

(T.27).

As they approached the

outskirts of Wellington, appellant told ber that he could
not take her into Wellington because she lived there (T.27),
at which time he turned the truck around, traveled about
a half mile, then turned onto a dirt road and parked
the truck (T.27,28).

The appellant removed the keys

from the truck's ignition (T.28), and began drinking
more beer (T.28).
tampax out (T.66).

He told the prosecutrix to take her
He then forced her to have sexual

intercourse against her will (T.29-30,61,144).

Appellant

also forced her to commit sodomy, forcing her mouth onto
his penis, holding and pushing her head down to the point
where she was gagging (T.28,59,144).

The appellant, when

asked at trial as to whether or not the prosecutrix gave
any objection to this type of conduct, replied:
it's not an objection deal.

You know, when you're in that

situation, it feels better .
You know, it's a better feeling.
(T.l44-145).

"Well,

to hold them down there.
It's part of sex."

He also responded, when asked at trial whether

or not he had any indication that the prosecutrix was
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resisting, that "· • • Yes.

I had to • • • the feeling

that I was going too long, yes."

(T.l46).

The prosecutrix testified at trial that she
tried to resist this entire ordeal (T.59), but when she
tried to turn away she was overpowered (T.59).

She

further stated that she felt as if the appellant was
going to take her life (T.29,31,57,64).

Each time she

would resist, the appellant would hurt her even more
(T.64).

At one point, he told her that "all her troubles

would be over" when they went to Indian Canyon
67), and that "she had a right to be scared."

(T.31,
(T.33).

When asked why she did not try to use a knife she was
carrying at the time, the prosecutrix stated that she
tried to get possession of it, but was not allowed to move
her hands, only to keep them at her side (T.30,31,52,58,
62).

Finally, the prosecutrix stated at trial that the

intercourse was against her will (T.63,64), that she
objected because some man who she did not know was "making
me do something against my will"

(T.65) with a knife at

her throat (T.71), and that the appellant never asked her
if she would do anything, he just made her do it (T.69).
The prosecution also testified that appellant ejaculated
on her chest, and that she wiped it off with her shirt
(T.30,150).

This was corroborated by appellant (T.l50),

and by the state's V.'i tness, Ja..'":les Gaskill,

the Di:cector
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of the Criminal Laboratory at Weber State College, who
testified that he found semen stains on the chest area of
the prosecutrix's T-shirt (T.ll4).

Mr. Gaskill also

testified that he had found blood stains on the crotch
area of one of the T-shirts (Exhibit No •. 2), and also
near the bottom on the front of another T-shirt (Exhibit
No. 3)

(T.ll4,115).

The blood type was type "A" human

blood, the same type as that of the prosecutrix (T.llS).
Following these sexual assaults on the
prosecutrix, appellant drove the prosecutrix to Price,
where she talked him into permitting her to go inside
at the Gas-N-Go store to purchase a 7-Up (T.36).

Upon

entering, she told the attending lady, Joy Lott, that
she had been raped and asked her to call the police (T.38,
73).

Ms. Lott later stated at trial that the prosecutrix

at the time of this incident was shaking--near tears (T.73),
and that she (prosecutrix) broke down and started crying
the minute the police arrived (T.75-76).

The prosecutrix

was, as Ms. Lott described, "frantic" (T.74).
Upon the arrival of the police, the appellant
"took off like a shot," squealing the tires on the
prosecutrix's truck as he began his evasion of the
police (T.39,75,79).

Several miles later, appellant

was cornered by the police, got out of the truck, and ran
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(T.B0-81).

Officer Joe Ori, one of the officers who

gave chase, stated at trial that he noticed the
appellant trying to take off a belt as he was driving
(T.BB).

A knife was later found by Officer Ori on·the

side of the road near the driver's side of the truck
which the appellant was driving (T.86,95).

This knife

was shown to the prosecutrix at the police station,
and she stated that it did not belong to her.

She had

already recovered her own knife (T.94-95).
When appellant abandoned the prosecutrix's
truck, he ran and hid in the woods, where he was
eventually found, apprehended, and arrested by Officer
Ori (T.89,90).
The prosecutrix was taken to the hospital
that same night (actually early morning) where she was
examined by a doctor (T.lOl).

Margaret Robertson, a

licensed practical nurse who was present during the
examination, testified that the prosecutrix seemed to be
very upset, very depressed, and crying (T.l02-103).

She

also observed bruises on the prosecutrix, quite a few
contusions on her neck and breast area and some abrasions
around the vaginal opening as well as contusions inside
the opening (T.l03,104).
this (T.l03,104).

The doctor's report confirmed

The prosecutrix, at the time of the exam,
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stated that they would find no sperm inside her because
the appellant had ejaculated on her chest (T.l0?-108).
Also present at the hospital were the prosecutrix's mother and ex-husband, who both testified that they
observed bruises on her breast as well as scars on her
neck and scratches on her thighs (T.l2,110).

The

prosecutrix testified that the appellant had bit her
and pinched her, as one of her nipples had bled and
she noticed herself badly bruised (T.39,40).
Officer Vuksinick testified that when he saw
the prosecutrix at the hospital she appeared awfully
upset--her eyes puffed, swolen, and very red as if she
had been crying (T.82-83).

Officer Ori stated that

upon encountering the prosecutrix after she had been to
the hospital the night she was raped, she was so shaken it
was hard for her to talk (T.93).
During a pre-trial conference and in chambers,
the prosecution made a motion in limine to prevent
appellant from "going into prior sexual matters of the
victim"

(T.3).

The motion was made because at the

preliminary hearing, appellant's counsel, over objection

by the prosecution, went into some prior sexuai
relationships involving the prosecutrix.

-9-

Questions
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such as, "Does she like to make comparisons with other
menJ did she like to have sex during her period" were
asked, as well as questions involving whether she had
been involved previously in "male sex" with other
people (T.3).
The trial court granted the prosecution's
motion, and in explaining to appellant's counsel its
reasoning, stated:
. It's the Court's opinion
that--it's true you're entitled to go
into her [prosecutrix's] predisposition
as to general reputation, but I don't
think you're entitled to go into any
specific acts, whether they involve her
personally or with someone else, which
obviously has to be in a sexual situation.
But you're limited to general reputation
and general reputation means what it
says, general reputation in the
community, what it means to people.
And you can't go beyond that in the
Court's opinion.
So the Court is going
to grant the motion to limit any type of
questions you ask--not to get into any
sexual desires as far as she is concerned
regarding specific acts.
So you're going
to be limited to general reputation.
(T. 5).

The Court went on and stated further:
. . . we're going to limit it strictly
to reputation.
But if you have witnesses
who can testify to her general reputation
in the community, then, of course, those
witnesses can so testify.
But until the
matter of reputation is opened up by one
side or the other, there can't be any questions
about the prior conduct.
That's the ruling
of the Court.
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The trial court later modified its order
granting the prosecution's motion in limine, allowing
appellant's counsel to examine witnesses and the
prosecutrix relative to the sodomy charge regarding
any sexual preference that the

prosecutr~x

may have

had as showing an inclination as to whether she
consented or not:
• • . The Court at this time
is going to modify its order previously
made in limine, in that the Court feels
in a charge of sodomy, which we have
in this case, that the defendant would
be entitled to ask the alleged victim
relative to any sexual preference that
she might have, as showing an inclination as to whether she consented or
not. However, the Court will retain
the order relative to limiting any
specific acts with any specific people
on any other occasions.
(T. 6-7).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR, UNDER THE CONTROLLING DECISIONS OF THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT, THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE,
AND THE DECISIONS AND STATUTES OF THE MAJORITY
OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS, IN GRANTING THE
PROSECUTION'S MOTION IN LIMINE.

Prior to the trial on November 27, 1978, a hearing
was held in chambers in which the prosecution made a Motion
in Limine, asking the Court to instruct defense counsel not
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to go into prior sexual matters of the victim

(T.3,R.30).

The reason for the motion was to prevent defense counsel
from asking questions of the victim such as those asked
at the preliminary hearing.

Defense counsel apparently

asked such questions of the prosecutrix as: "Does she
(prosecutrix) like to make comparisons with other men;"
and "did she like to have sex during her period."

Another

question asked of the victim by defense counsel at the
preliminary hearing referred to a threat that the defendant
said that he was "going to perform male sex on her and asked
her if she had done that with other people before" (T.3).
The trial judge granted the Motion in Limine,
stating that it was the Court's opinion that defense counsel
was entitled to go into the prosecutrix's predisposition
as to general reputation, but was not entitled to ask about
any specific sexual acts (T.S)
Respondent's Brief).

(see Statement of Facts,

The Court subsequently modified its

order granting the Motion in Limine regarding the sodomy
charge, allowing defense counsel to ask the victim about any
sexual preferences she might have regarding whether she
consented (T.6).
Appellant contends on appeal that the trial
court committed reversible error in granting the Motion in
Limine, thereby denying the appellant his opportunity to
provide evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
sexual permissiveness
and
immoral
evidence
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered
by thecharacter;
Utah State Library.
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as

to witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual
permissiveness and immoral characteri evidence as to
the appellant's opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual
permissiveness and immoral character based upon alleged
representations made to him by the prosecutrix;
evidence as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and
customs; and evidence of specific instances of behavior
which establish the prosecutrix's sexual habits and
customs.

Such evidence is alleged by the appellant to

have been critical to the issues of the prosecutrix's
alleged consent and the appellant's alleged lack of
criminal intent as to all counts of his criminal conduct.
Respondent agrees with appellant that the focal
point of the present case is the issue of consent.
Respondent submits that scrutiny of the facts as reflected
in the record and adherence to existing case law as set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court reveal that the trial court
was correct in granting the prosecution's Motion in Limine.
Furthermore, the questions asked of the appellant and his
witness by appellant's counsel concerning the prosecutrix's
reputation for sexual morality were unable to be answered
due to a lack of knowledge in one case and an unwillingness
on the part of a defense witness in the other case.
Prior to a discussion of the applicable case and
statutory law, a review of some pertinent facts is necessary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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During the trial, the prosecutrix was asked on crossexamination several questions by appellant's counsel
concerning her sexual desires and preferences regarding
men in general as well as the appellant:
Q.
(Defense counsel) : At this
point in time, how long had you been
divorced from Danny (prosecutrix's exhusband)?
A.
(Prosecutrix) :
. • Two
years. • • We was thinking about getting
back together, maybe getting married
again. (T. 42).

*Q.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

(Defense counsel) : Were there
problems in that reconciliation in that you
had interest in other men? (Emphasis added.)
A.
(Prosecutrix):
No.
(T. 43).
(Emphasis added.)

Q.

(Defense counsel) : You found
Steve (appellant) attractive; didn't you?
A.
(Prosecutrix):
I did not. (T. 43).

*

(Defense counsel) : ~/hen you find
a nice looking man, do you say in your head
to yourself that: "I find this man attractive?"
A.
(Prosecutrix) : Oh, maybe sometimes.
Q.
(Defense counsel) : And do you also
say:
"I maybe would like to get it on with
this man, or have sex with this person?"
(Emphasis added.)
A.
(Prosecutrix):
No, I don't.
(Emphasis
added.)
Q.
(Defense counsel):
You don't do that?
A.
(Prosecutrix):
(Indicating negatively)·
The Court:
What was your answer?
The Witness:
No.
(Emphasis added.)
Q.
(Defense counsel) : When you see an
attractive man, do you say:
"This is an attractiv
man and I would like to have intercourse with hm?
A.
(Prosecutrix): When I see an attracti\'E
man, I look at his hair and then I comment:
"He's
got nice hair or he's nice lookincr."
I have no
feelings about sexual emotions wi~h them.
(T.43-'
(Emphasis
added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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*

*

*

Q.
(Defense counsel) : You say this
sexual intercouse went on for hours.
How many hours--how many hours?
A.
(Prosecutrix) :
• a long time.
Q.
(Defense counsel): You enjoyed
it, didn't you?
A.
(Prosecutrix): No, I didn't. It
hurt me.
I was bruised. He wasn't trying
to be nice about it. • •
(Defense counsel) : Is that
Q.
what offended you?
A.
(Prosecutrix): No. He scared me,
because I felt like he was going to take my
life.
Q.
(Defense counsel) : You made no
effort to resist, Gloria; isn't that correct?
A.
(Prosecutrix): Would you with a knife
that was at your throat?
(T.56).

*

*

*

*

*

*

Q.
(Defense counsel) : To go down on him and
have a penis of a man in your mouth was nothing
to you; isn't that correct? (Emphasis added.)
rtr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney): Your
Honor, I object.
Ms. Taylor (defense counsel):
I'm not making
reference to any specific prior act, your Honor.
The Court: All right. The objection is
overruled. Can you answer that?
The Witness (prosecutrix): Yes, I have done
it before.
(Emphasis added.)
Q.
(Defense counsel): It was not new to
you?
(Emphasis added.)
A.
(Prosecutrix): No. But only with my
husband.
(Emphasis added.)
(T.60).
(Defense Counsel) : That you were on your
period was not . . . That you're on your period is
not necessarily a reason not to have sex; is it?
(Emphasis added.)
A.
(Prosecutrix): I usually don't like sex
on my period.
I don't do that.
(Emphasis added.)
Q.
(Defense counsel): Usually?
A.
(Prosecutrix) : Most of the time I won't.
I don't like it.
(T. 66). (Emphasis added.)
Q.

Clearly it can be seen that from the above colloquy,
appellant's counsel was allowed a wide range of latitude
in
the cross-examination of the victim regarding her sexual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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habits as well as attitudes about men in general or the
appellant.

As will be shortly discussed, Utah case law

prohibits cross-examination into prior specific acts,
with the exception of a few qualified instances n0t
applicable in the present case.
The following testimony was elicited from
Joyce Johnson, the girlfriend of appellant:
Q.
(Defense counsel) : Had you known
her (prosecutrix) and known of her to the
point where you would be able to make a
statement with regard to her reputation in
the community with regard to sexual behabior?
*
*
*
The witness (Joyce Johnson): Yes.
Q.
(Defense counsel) : And would you
state for the jury to your knowledge the
reputation that she does have in the
community with regards to this?
Mr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney):
I'm going to object.
There's no foundation
and it's improper phrasing of the question.
The Court:
I think we have to limit it,
of course, to the general reputation of as to
chastity and sexual morality, as I recall-are the phrases that are used.
So if you want
to rephrase your question in that regard.
Q.
(Defense counsel) : Would you make a
statement with regard to chastity or her morality?
The Court: Sexual morality.
Ms. Taylor (defense counsel) : Sexual
morality.
Mr. Boutwell (prosecuting attorney): Again,
we're talking about knowing her socially, but not ,
on the job--or for a while.
The phrasing isn't ng:.:
'Do you know her now socially, what's her reputatio<'
I don't think there's any foundation.
That's my
objection.
The Court: All right.
The objection is
overruled.
You may answer.
Mr. Boutv.•ell (prosecuting attorney) : ~lay I
voir dire the witness out of the presence of the
jury before she ~akes her answer?
The Court: No.
I think we'll leave 1t to
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foundation.
I believe she can give her
opinion as to these items.
Q.
(Defense counsel): You do have an
opinion?
A.
(Joyce Johnson): Yes.
The Court: As to general reputation
we're talking about.
Q.
(Defense counsel): We realize it
is your opinion and it is you+ own. Will you
tell the jury what that is, please?
A.
(Joyce Johnson): I'd rather not.
(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Boutwell: Your Honor, she asked for
her opinion.
That is objectionable. . •
The Court: Of course, that is objectionable.
We can't let her give her own opinion relative
to general reputation.
Mr. Boutwell: She's got to give the
opinion of society, not her opinion.
The Witness (Joyce Johnson):
I don't know
what the opinion of society is.
(T.l27-129).
(Emphasis added.)
The testimony of Ms. Johnson refutes appellant's allegation
that he was unable to examine witnesses as to the prosecutrix's
reputation for sexual permissiveness and

~oral

character.

Ms. Johnson did not know what the opinion of society to be.
She was prohibited from giving her own opinion regarding the
prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral
character because of the operation of Rules 46 and 47 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence,
2

2

as well as the case of State v.

Rule 46, Utah Rules of Evidence, states in full: When a
peron's character or trait of his character is in issue, it
may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, evidence
of reputation; or evidence of specific instances of the
person's conduct, subject, however, to the limitations of
Rules 47 and 48."
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 47, Utah Rules of
Evidence, states in relevant part:
"Subject to Rule 48, when
a trait of a person's character is relevant as tending to prove
his conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may be proved
in the same manner as provided by Rule 46, except that (a)
evidence of specific instances of conduct other than evidence
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Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1288, 1291 (1978), wherein this
court stated in that case of forcible sexual abuse:
Further, the accepted procedure in
eliciting testimony of one's reputation as it
pertains to his character or a trait of.his
character that is in issue is to first qualify
the witness by determining if he is acquainted
with the reputation of the person in question,
and if so, then to have him relate what that
reputation is. However appropriate it may be
to prove a character trait in issue by
testimony in the form of an opinion (the
Court here cites Rule 46, Utah Rules of
Evidence), it is not a~ropriate to elicit
from the witness his in ividual opinion as
to what the erson's reputation is in re ard
thereto.
(Emphasis added.
The Court explained, referring to testimony from a defendant:
Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints"
of prior incidents of similar conduct have no
relevancy to the issue of defendant's truthfulness or veracity. The admission of such
evidence without further explanation could only
have caused the jury to speculate about
defendant's propensities to commit such crimes
and confuse the issues . .
578 P.2d at 1290.

This Court should apply the same reasoning to a
personal

opinion regarding the sexual permissiveness and

immoral character of the victim of a rape as was attempted
to be elicited from a defendant-witness.

Joyce Johnson's

opinion of the victim's reputation was correctly limited
because she did not know what the community's opinion was.
The record also reflects that the appellant had
no basis for knowing the prosecutrix's reputation for
sexual permissiveness or immoral characLer.

The appellant
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___,.,

had not been in Utah very long, having just come from
California (T.l36).

He did not have the opportunity to

ascertain any opinions which the community may have had
regarding the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual
permissiveness or immoral character.

He certainly would

not have any information or representation furnished by the
prosecutrix regarding her reputation, habits and customs,
or sexual preferences due to the fact that he met her for
the first time the night of the rape (T.20,138).

Further-

more, the record reveals that there was no conversation
between appellant and the prosecutrix regarding her
reputation for sexual permissiveness and immoral character,
her sexual habits and customs (if there in fact were any),
or sexual preferences.

3

Thus, he had no foundation or basis

for either knowing of the prosecutrix's reputation for
sexual permissiveness and immoral character (again, if in
fact there was one, and the record reveals no evidence
whatsoever of any), or for forming any opinion as to her
reputation, habits and customs, preferences, etc.

Finally,

any opinion which Joyce Johnson had regarding the prosecutrix's
reputation, habits and customs, or preferences which may
have been communicated to the appellant would be
inadmissible via the testimony of appellant because of
violation of the heresay rule.

3

It is also noteworthy
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~he

age of puberty and beyond have some sexual habits and
customs, as well as sexual preferences.

of

that Ms. Johnson testified that she did not know the
reputation in the community regarding the prosecutrix's
sexual morality, thus any testimony proffered by appellant
based on statements by Ms. Johnson regarding such·would
also be inadmissible.
Respondent thus submits that appellant was not
thwarted in his cross-examination of the prosecutrix nor
in the examination of any witnesses, including Ms. Johnson.
There was no factual basis to form a foundation for most
of the questions he wanted to ask.

Those questions which

were allowed were answered by Ms. Johnson and the
prosecutrix, perhaps the answers not being to the liking
of the appellant, but nonetheless, they were answered.
The credibility of these answers, of course, was exclusively
the prerogative of the jury, State v. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198,
310 P. 2d 388 (1957), and on appeal from a criminal conviction,
this Court is obliged to accept that version of the evidence
which supports the verdict, which in the case at bar, was
guilty on all three counts.

State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71,

498 P.2d 357 (1972); State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466
(1975).
Case and statutory law in Utah as well as in the
overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions support
respondent's view that the trial judge was correct in grant:
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the prosecution's Motion in Limine regarding the
prosecutrix's specific conduct on prior occasions with
any one man.
In Utah, the law regarding interrogation of
a rape victim was originally stated by this Court in
State v. Scott, 55 Utah 553, 188 Pac. 860 (1920):
Where the defendant admits the sexual
act, but contends that the prosecutrix
consented thereto, and where, as here, she
is of lawful age, such evidence (general
reputation for chastity or prosecutrix) is
relevant and material upon the question of
consent.
188 Pac. 864.
[However], the authorities are very
numerous,
indeed the great weight of
authority is to the effect, that the
prosecutrix cannot be interrogated on
cross-examination as to whether she had
had sexual intercouse with others than the
defendant. The doctrine is based upon the
fact, and the great weight of authority is
to the effect, that specific acts of intercourse with others than the defendant may
not be shown.
If it is desired to prove
that the prosecutrix ~s a lewd woman, that
may only be done by attack~ng her general
reputation for chastity and morality, and not
by showing specific acts of wrongdoing . .
188 P.2d 865 (emphasis added).
This Court reaffirmed the Scott principle in State v. Smith,
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936), further explaining its
logic for excluding testimony concerning a rape victim's prior
isolated acts of intercouse with men other than the defendant.
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In cases of rape where the prosecutrix
is over the age of consent, her bad reputation for chastity is a proper matter for
consideration of the jury as affecting her
credibility and bearing on the probability
of consent. State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170,
51 Pac. 818; 1 Wharton's Crim. Evid. 481 • •
In some jurisdictions the courts hold that
the prosecuting witness may be examined as
to previous acts of immorality on her part
as affecting her credibility as a witness
[cites omitted]. There are grounds for
distinction between examination of a
prosecutrix as to prev~ous conduct showing
her to be a common prostitute and merely
as to isolated acts of intercourse.
The former
conduct would indicate a low state of morals and
affect cred~bil~ty as a w~tness, while isolated
acts might have no such bearing.
[cite omitted.]
62 P. 2d 1113.
The latest sex abuse case in Utah involving the issue
of consent and the scope of cross-examination to be permitted i:
that of State v. Howard, Utah, 544 P.2d 466 (1975), which
appellant cites in support of his argument.

In Howard, the

defendant picked up the prosecutrix alongside the highway,
asking her if she would like to go for a ride.

She accepted

and they drove southward for about two hours, where the
defendant turned off the main highway, driving over a hill
and parking his truck.

At this point the prosecutrix claimed

that the defendant seized an ice pick, placed it at her
throat, threatened her, dragged her from the truck and
threw her to the ground, raping her.

The defendant claimed

that he and the prosecutrix engaged in petting and
preliminaries, followed by consensual intercourse.

The
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stopping on the way in Manti to use the restroom.

When

arriving in Ephraim at her cousins, the prosecutrix called
her parents, telling them of the attack.

She also reported

the incident to a male friend, who accompanied her to the
sheriff, where she gave the information.upon which the
defendant was arrested and charged.
This Court, after noting some inconsistencies in
the prosecutrix's story as well as taking into account the
trial court's sustaining of the prosecuting attorney's
objection to testimony about the reputation of the
prosecutrix in the locality,

4

vacated the conviction

and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Court was

clearly correct in its ruling, for the law prior to and
after Howard is that the reputation of the prosecutrix in
the community for chastity is a proper matter for consideration of the jury as affecting her credibility and bearing
on the issue of consent.

State v. Smith, supra; State v.

Scott, supra; Rules 46, 47, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

trial judge in the Howard case should have permitted the
defendant's witness to testify about the prosecutrix's
reputation in the locality for moral character because
the witness testified that he knew what the reputation was.

4

The witness stated that he knew the reputation of the
prosecutrix in the locality as to moral character. The
court, after objection by the prosecution, refused to
let bythe
testify
as toprovided
what
was.
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In contrast is the present case, where the appellant's
witness, Joyce Johnson, testified that she did not
know what the prosecutrix's reputation in the community
for sexual morality was (T.l27-129).

FurthermoreJ the

appellant in the present case was never asked that question
either on direct or cross-examiantion.

As previously

discussed, appellant would not have possessed the knowledge
to answer such a question as he had only just recently
arrived in Utah from California (T.l36), was not even
living in the same community as the prosecutrix (she lived

in \'iellington, the appellant was staying in Helper at
his sister's home (T.l9,121)), and could not have received
information from Joyce Johnson regarding the prosecutrix's
reputation since she (Joyce Johnson)

stated that prior to

the night of the rape, she had not seen the appellant in
4 or 5 months (T.ll9,121).

Thus, appellant would not have

had the opportunity to learn of the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual morality in her locality of Wellington.
Respondent submits, therefore, that appellant's
allegation that he was denied the opportunity to provide
evidence of the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual
permissiveness and immoral character as well as evidence
of witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual
permissiveness and

i~~oral

character are not well founded.
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The appellant was never asked such a question, and if
he had, would have been unable to provide an answer as he
had no opportunity to know what society's opinion may
have been.

The appellant's witness (Joyce Johnson) was

asked about society's opinion of the prosecutrix's
reputation for sexual morality, to which she answered
that she did not know (T.l27-129).

Neither the appellant

nor his witness could have testified as to their personal
opinion of the prosecutrix's reputation in the community
for sexual morality.

State v. Goodliffe, supra, at

578 P.2d 1291.
Appellant further argues that the trial court
should have permitted him to provide evidence as to his
opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and
immoral character based upon alleged representations made
to him by the prosecutrix.

As previously discussed in

State v. Goodliffe, supra, the Utah Supreme Court has
declared that "it is not appropriate to elicit from the
witness his individual opinion as to what the person's
reputation is in regard thereto."

The Court makes this

statement without qualifications or limitations, except
to reinforce the validity of the declaration by stating
such to be the law, "However appropriate it may be to
prove a character trait in issue by testimony in the form
of opinion."

The Court has not made exceptions such as
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appellant urges here, i.e., for the appellant's opinion
evidence to be admitted because it is allegedly "based
upon representations made to him by the prosecutrix."
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record of any
conversation between the prosecutrix and appellant
regarding any alleged representations by the prosecutrix
regarding her alleged sexual permissiveness or immoral
character.

Rule 56 (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
If the witness is not testifying as
an expert his testimony in the form of
opinion or inferences is limited to such
opinions or inferences as the judge finds
(a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful
to a clear understanding of his testimony
or to the determination of the fact in
issue.

The trial judge obviously did not feel that any such
testimony by the appellant regarding his opinion of the
prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and immoral
character based upon her alleged representations met the
criteria in subsections (a) or (b)

in Rule 56(1).

Such

a decision to preclude such testimony by the appellant
is also supported by Rules 46 and 47 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, as Rule 46 allows testimony concerning a
person's character or trait (when it is in issue) in the
form of opinion, subject however, to Rule

4~,

which

prohibits evidence of specific conduct other than evidence
of conviction of a

crL~e.

Thus appellant's argunent
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to his opinion of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual
permissiveness and immoral character based upon·alleged
representations which she made to him is not well founded
based upon the record or legal authority.
Appellant's final allegation +egards the
trial court's limitation on the evidence appellant wished
to offer as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs
as well as evidence of specific instances of behavior which
establish the prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs.
Appellant cites Rules 49 and 50 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence in support of his claim that evidence of the
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs should have been
admitted.

Those rules read respectively:
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant
to an issue of behavior on a specified
occasion, but is admissible on that issue
only as tending to prove that the behavior
on such occasion conformed to the habit or
custom.
Rule 49.
Testimony in the form of opinion is
admissible on the issue of habit or custom.
Evidence of specific instances of behavior
is admissible to prove habit or custom if the
evidence is of a sufficient number of such
instances to warrant a finding of such habit
or custom.
Rule SO.

Respondent submits a two-fold argument.

First that Rule

49 is modified by Rule 50 in that Rule 50 states there must
be evidence of a sufficient number of instances of behavior
before evidence of such instances of behavior can be
admitted
for the purpose of showing that the specified
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

instance of behavior in question conformed to a habit or
custom.

The record in this case nowhere reflects that

appellant knew of

a

sufficient number of instances of

sexual behavior regarding the prosecutrix in order to
warrant a finding of any sexual habits or customs.

He

had met the prosecutrix for the first time the night he
raped her.

He had only been in Utah a short time, having

come in from California, and he was not even living in the
same locality as the prosecutrix.

Thus, he had no basis

for any first-hand knowledge concerning the prosecutrix's
sexual habits or customs.

Secondly, respondent submits

that even if the prosecutrix did have some sexual habits
and customs, their admission would have been irrelevant.
The evidence conclusively demonstrated that the prosecutrix
was forced to have intercourse with the appellant at the
threat of a knife at her throat.

She was also forced to

commit sodomy--pursuant to the same threat.

She had

physical evidence of bruises on her body, specifically her
nipples on her breasts were bleeding from being pinched, her
vagina was bruised, and she had scars on her neck (T.l2,
40,82,93,101-104,110).

She also had a cut on her throat

from the appellant's knife (T.24,25).

Certainly, even

if her sexual habit was to have intercourse with other
men, this did not give the appellant the right to forcibly
rape her and force her to cormni t sodomy as v:ell

as l:idnap
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her.

As this Court stated in State v. Howard, supra, at

544 P.2d 469:
It is not to be questioned that the
fact that a woman may be of bad reputation,
or that she may be known to be immoral or
even completely dissolute of character does
not give anyone license to forcibly violate
her.
The

proscription of Howard would be the case in the present

situation even if there was evidence of bad sexual habits
or reputation on the part of the prosecutrix.
is no such evidence.

But there

The facts are that the appellant

admitted to all of the essential elements of the crimes of
forcible rape and sodomy.

He asserts the defense of consent,

yet the record indicates that he knew that what he was
forcing the prosecutrix to do was against her will (see
Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts, supra).

Thus,

appellant's insistence on being allowed to introduce
evidence as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits and
customs is not well founded.
The denial by the trial judge of appellant's
request to introduce evidence of specific instances of
behavior which would allegedly establish the prosecutrix's
sexual habits and customs was correct and case law clearly
refutes appellant's contention.

Appellant cites State v.

Howard, supra, as authority in support of his proposition,
as well as Rules 49 and 50 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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The applicable portion of the Court's opinion in Howard
is as follows:
• • • though it is not proper to
permit inquiry into specific acts of prior
misconduct of the victim, where the critical
issue is consent, and the circumstances are
such that i t reasonably appears that evidence
concerning her moral character would have
sufficient probative value to outweigh any
detrimental aspects of admitting such
testimony, it should be admitted.
544 P.2d at 469.
Assuming arguendo that the last phrase in the above quoted
Court's opinion "it should be admitted" refers to specific
acts of prior misconduct of the victim, respondent must
point out that appellant has ignored two important factors:
(1) two conditions precedent to the admission of testimony
regarding specific acts of prior misconduct;

(2) subsequent

case law to the Howard case rejecting appellant's argument.
The two conditions precedent to the admission
of specific acts of prior misconduct are:

(1) the critical

issue must be consent (as it is in the present case);

(2)

"the circumstances must be such that it reasonbly appears
the evidence concerning [the prosecutrix's] moral character
would have sufficient probative value to outweigh any
detrimental aspects of admitting such testimony."

Such a

determination is of course within the discretion of the
trial judge, and this Court has declared that the trial
court will be reversed only if he abuses that discretion,
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or if the exclusion of such evidence regarding specific
acts of the prosecutrix would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict.
(1978).

State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017
Rule 45 and Rule 5, Utah Rules.of Evidence.

5

Respondent submits that allowing evidence concerning
the prosecutrix's specific prior acts would not have
had sufficient probative value to outweigh any detrimental

5

Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
Except as in these rules otherwise
provided, the judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time,
or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and
harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that
such evidence would be offered.
(Emphasis
added.)
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a)
it appears of record that the proponent of the
evidence either made known the substance of the
evidence in a form and by a method approved by
the judge, or indicated the substance of the
expected evidence by questions indicating the
desired answers, and (b) the court which passes
upon the effect of the error or errors is of the
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bringing about
a different verdict or finding.
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aspects of admitting such testimony.

Such admission would

only have created undue prejudice towards

the prosecutrix,

for the real issue was whether she consented on this
particular occasion, not what she may have or not·have
done with some other man on a prior occasion.

The jury

could easily have been confused and misled as to the
real issues, thereby "trying" the prosecutrix instead
of the appellant.
Respondent also notes that appellant did not
substantially comply with subsection (a) of Rule 5 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, whereby the proponent of the evidence
either makes known the substance of the evidence to be offered
in a form approved by the judge or indicates the substance of
the expected evidence by questions indicating the desired
answers.

Such a procedure was not followed by the appellant.

Appellant has given the Court no evidence in the record
that he knew of any prior misconducts on the part of
the prosecutrix.

Thus, even if arguendo, the evidence

was erroneously excluded, the verdict would not be reversed
due to noncompliance with subsection (a) of Rule 5 and
also due to the fact that the excluded evidence would not
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
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different verdict as prescribed in subsection (b) of
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The case law in Utah since the Howard case
has been directly contrary to

appellant~s

argument

for admission of evidence of the prosecutrix's
prior specific acts of misconduct (if there were
any).

In State v. Starks, supra, during the cross-

examination of a witness, counsel attempted to
show misconduct on the part of the witness at an
earlier time in order to attack his credibility.
Rejecting the proffered testimony, the Court,
relying upon Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 22
and 47, stated:

-33-
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• • • "it is clear that only
previous convictions, and not previous
acts of misconduct which do not result
in conviction, may be used to impeach a
witness' credibility."
581 P.2d at 1017.

The Court further stated its reasoning:

In the instant matter, the proffered
testimony would not have any relevance
to the question of guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
581 P.2d at 1017.

Similarly, in State v. Minnish, Utah,

560 P.2d 340, 341 (1977), this Court stated:
. Rule 47 (U.R.E.) definitely
requires reiection of evidence of
specific behavior to prove a character
trait except evidence of conviction of
a crime.
Even though appellant urges that the evidence of
the prosecutrix's prior specific acts

(he has made no

such proffer of such evidence) is critical to the issue of
consent, respondent submits that specific acts go to the
credibility of the witness, and thus the ruling in State v.
Starks, supra, would apply as well as Rule 46 and 47 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Therefore, evidence of prior

S?ecific acts for purposes of impeachment would be inadmissible unless such acts resulted in conviction.
In appellant's brief, he has argued that a
number of other jurisdictions have adopteci. positions
similar to that contended for

b~

appellant, and he cites
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various authorities.

The cases cited by appellant

involving the jurisdictions of Kentucky and Texas have
modified by later enactment of statutes. 6

Similarly, other

cases cited by the appellant involving the jurisdictions
of Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Virginia
were misinterpreted by appellant as being supportive of
his argument, whereas they are in fact not (see Appellant's
Brief, p. 9 for specific cites of those cases).

The ruling

in the case cited by appellant involving the District of
Columbia was later changed by a subsequent case.

7

As an example, appellant cites the case of

~

v. Herrera, 582 P.2d 384 (N.M. 1978), as being supportive of
his argument.

A close look reveals just the opposite.

In

that case, the defendant was charged with, among other
things, criminal sexual penetration.

He was convicted and

appealed, claiming among other things, that the trial court
erred in prohibiting questioning of the victim concerning
past sexual conduct.

He asserted that this prohibition

6

Kentucky: 1976, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.145; Texas:
1979, Tex. Penal Code § 21.13.

7

1977, McLean v. United States, D.C. et. App., 377
All. 2d 74, wherein it was held that evidence of a
victim's crior sexual relations with others and of
her reputation for unchastity are not admissible on
the issue of consent or for purpose of impeachment.
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limited his constitutional right to confront witnesses
him.

ag~inst

The appellant in that case also attacked the con-

stitutionality of a procedural statute involved, which
read as follows:
40A-9-26. Testimony--Limitations-In camera hearing--A. As a matter of
substantive right, in prosecutions under
sections 2 through 6 of this act [40A-9-21
to 40A-9-25 (sexual crimes)], evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct, opinion
evidence thereof, or of reputation for
past sexual conduct, shall not be admitted
unless, and only to the extent that the
court finds, that evidence of the victim's
past sexual conduct is material to the
case and that its inflammatory or
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value.
B.
If such evidence is proposed
to be offered, the defendant must file
a written motion prior to trial. The
court shall hear such pretrial motion
prior to trial at an in camera hearing
to determine whether such evidence is
admissible under subsection A of this
section .
. if such proposed evidence is
deemed admissible, the court shall issue
a written order stating what evidence
may be introduced by the defendant and
stating the specific questions to be
permitted.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held the statute constitutional,
and further upheld the decision of the trial court,
affirming the conviction of the defendant:
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in our opinion • • • past
sexual conduct, in itself, indicates
nothing concerning consent in a particular
case. This is a starting point because
relevancy is not an inherent characteristic
of any item of evidence, but exists only
as a relation between an item of evidence
and a matter properly provable in the
case.
[Cite omitted.]
If defendant claims a victim's past
sexual conduct is relevant to the issue
of the victim's consent, it is up to the
defendant to make a preliminary showing
which indicates relevancy • • • The
question of relevancy is not raised
by asserting that it exists, there must
be a showing of a reasonable basis for
believing that past sexual conduct is
pertinent to the consent issue.
[Cite
omitted.]

*

*

*

Absent a showing sufficient to
raise an issue as to relevancy, questions
concerning past sexual conduct are to be
excluded.
582 P.2d at 393.
Respondent takes the time to examine the Herrera
case for two reasons.

One, is that the case certainly

does not support, as appellant contends in his brief, the
proposition urged on this Court that evidence of prior
particular acts of unchastity or other sexual misconduct
are admissible on the issue of consent.

Neither the Herrera

case nor the statute in question there held such a
proposition.

The New Mexico Court found them to be

inadmissible unless a showing of relevancy could be made.
Second, the trial judge in the present case followed the
rules set forth in the Herrera case.

He held a hearing
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in his chambers prior to trial and determined that
inquiries about past sexual acts with specific men
were not relevant to the issue of consent.
Even though Utah does not have a statute similar
to the one in question in the Herrera

c~se,

respondent

submits that this Court's holding in Howard (whereby it
was said that where consent is in issue and where
"circumstances are such that it reasonably appears that
evidence concerning [the prosecutrix's] moral character
would have sufficient probative value to outweigh any
detrimental effects of admitting such testimony it should
be admitted), is in essence the same as the substantive
portion of the New Mexico statute, i.e., are the prior
specific sexual acts relevant to the issue of consent?
If so, they are to be admitted.

The trial judge in

the present case, as well as the judge in the Herrera case,
found in the exercise of their discretion, such prior
specific sexual acts not to be relevant to the issue of
consent.
Most states are in agreement with Utah law
either by case law or statutory law that prior acts
of the prosecutrix are inadmissible on the issue of
consent or to impeach credibility unless a showing of
relevancy prior to trial can be made by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant.

8

Respondent submits that the trial judge was

8

See State v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 580 P.2d 1341 (1978)1
State v. Blum, 17 Wash.App. 37, 561 P.2d 226 (1977)i
State v. Ar1zona ex rel. Pope v. Superior court, In and
For County of Mojave, 113 Ariz. 22, S45 P.2d 946 (1976).
States with statutes limiting admissibility of prior sexual
acts without a showing of relevancy are:
Alabama: 1977, Ala.Code § 12-21-203.
Alaska: 1975, Alas. Stat. § 12.45.045.
Arkansas:l977, Ark. Stat. § 41-1810.0.
Calif.: 1974, Calif. Evid. Code SS 782, 1103.
Colo.:
1975, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-407.
Del.:
1974, Del. Code tit. 11 SS 3508-3509.
Florida: 1974, Fla. Stat. Ann. S 794.022.
Georgia: 1976, Ga. Code Ann. § 38-202.1.
Hawaii: 1977, Hawaii Rev. Stat. S 707-742.
Idaho:
1977, Idaho Code§ 18-6105.
Indiana: 1975, 1976, Burns Ind. Code Ann. S 35-1-32,5-1.
Iowa:
1977, Iowa Rules of Crim. Proc, Rule 20.
Kansas: K.S.A. 60-447a, Rules of Evidence,Rule 47a.
Kentucky:l976, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.145.
La.:
1975, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 15.498.
Maryland:l976, Md. Ann. Code Art. 27 S 461.
Mass.:
1977, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Chap. 233 S 21B.
Michigan:l974, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j.Minn.:
1975, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609-347.
Miss.:
1977, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-70.
Missouri:l977, Mo.Ann. Stat. § 491.015.
Nebraska:l975, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-408-05.
Nevada: 1971, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 48.069, 50.090.
N.J.:
1976, N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:84A-32.l.
N.M.:
1975, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-26.
N.Y.:
1975, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law§ 60.42.
N.C.:
1977, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-58.6.
Ohio:
1975, Page's Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
2907.02, 2907.05.
Okla.:
1975, Okla. Stat. Ann. § 22-750.
Oregon: 1975, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 164-475.
Pa.:
1976, Purdon's Cons. Penna. Stat. § 18-3104.
R.I.:
1975, R.I. RulesofCrim. Proc., Superior
Court, Rule 26.3.
S.C.:
1977, S.C. Code§ 16-3-659.1.
S.D.:
1975, S.D. Comp. Laws § 23-44-16.1.
Texas:
1975, Tex. Penal Code § 21.13.
I'<' ash. :
197 5, Wash. 'Rev. Code Ann. § 9. 7 9.150.
\'I.V.:
1976, W.Va. Code§ 61-BB-12.
\'lise.:
1975, Y.Jisc. Stat. Ann. § 972.11.
Wyo.:
1977, Wyo. Stat. lilln. § 6-4-312.
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acting within his discretion in limiting the evidence which
appellant sought to produce regarding the witnesses' opinions
of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and
immoral character; evidence as to the appellant's opinion
of the prosecutrix's alleged sexual permissiveness and
immoral character

base~

upon alleged representations made to

the appellant by the prosecutrix; evidence as to the
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs; and evidence of
specific instances of behavior which establish the
prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs.

In addition to

the cases cited, Rules of Evidence and reasoning set forth
therein, respondent calls the attention of the Court to
Rule 22(c) (d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which
encompasses all that has been argued:
As affecting the credibility of
a witness .
(c) evidence of traits
of his character other than truth,
honesty, or integrity or their
opposites, shall be inadmissible;
(d) evidence of specific instances
of his conduct relevant only as
tending to prove a trait of his
character, shall be inadmissible.
The trial judge did not err in refusing appellant's
line of examination and cross-examination.

Should this

Court hold otherwise, respondent submits that said exclusion
was harmless and would have had no prejudicial effect on the
verdict.

Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL CQURT DID NOT COMMIT
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DEFINING THE SCOPE
OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE INTO WHICH
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS ALLOWED TO
DELVE IN HIS EXAMINATION OF HIS
WITNESS.
Appellant alleges that the trial court, in
granting the prosecution's motion in limine, restricted
appellant's examination of witnesses regarding the
prosecutrix's reputation to her "general
the community."

reputation in

He then alleges that the trial court,

during the course of the trial, enlarged the scope of
"general reputation,"

to include the prosecutrix's

reputation as to "sexual morality," and then proceeded
to define and limit the scope of reputation evidence so
that the appellant was effectively denied the opportunity
to examine the witness on any aspect of the prosecutrix's
reputation.

Appellant cites portions of the trial transcript

(T. 127-129) in support of his argument.
Respondent submits that the trial judge's
limitation of the examination of Joyce Johnson (appellant's
witness) by aopellant's counsel to her

(witnesses')

knowledge of the prosecutrix's general reputation in the
community for sexual morality was' correct.

Furthermore,
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respondent submits that appellant's interpretation of the
colloquy on pages 127-129 of the trial transcript is purely
self-serving and at best, distorted.
The law in Utah regarding the intent to which a
witness may be examined regarding another's reputation is
very clear, particularly_in cases involving forcible
sex crimes.

In State v. Scott, supra, at 188 P. 855, this

Court stated:
. . . If it is desired to
prove that the prosecutrix is a
lewd woman, that may only be done by
attacking her general reputation for
chastity and morality.
Emphasis added.
In State v. Smith, supra, at 62 P.2d 1113, this Court declared:
In cases of rape where the
prosecutrix is over the age of
consent, her bad reputation for
chastitv is a proper matter for
consideration of the jury as affecting
her credibility and bearing on the
probab1ity of consent.
Emphasis added.
Similarly, in State v. Howard, supra, at 544 P.2d 470, this
Honorable Court again stated:
. the probative value of the
victim's reputation as to moral character
is sufficient to .
. justify the admission
of such evidence.
Emphasis added.
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Thus, it can be seen that in sexual abuse cases, the
trial court must allow reputation evidence as to "general
reputation for chastity and morality"

(Sco·tt), "bad

reputation for chastity" (Smith), or "reputation as
character"

~o

moral

(Howard) , assuming of course that proper

foundation is laid.
The question to be answered now is whether the
trial judge in the present case followed the law.
record reveals that he did.

The

The record shows that the

trial judge limited appellant's counsel's examination by
his witness to "her reputation in the community as to
chastity and sexual morality:"
Q.
(Defense counsel): Had you
known her and known of her to the point
where you would be able to make a
statement with regard to her reputation
in the community with regard to sexual
behavior?

*
The Witness:

*

*

Yes.

Q.
(Defense counsel): And would you
state for the jury your knowledge of the
reoutation that she does have in the commu~ity with regards to this (her sexual
behavior)?

*

*

*

The Court:
I think we have to limit
it, of course, to the general reputation
of as to chastity and sexual morality, as
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I recall--are the phrases that are
used. So if you want to rephrase
yourquestion in that regard--

Q. (Defense Counsel) : Would you make
a statement with regard to chastity or
her morality?
The Court:
Ms. Taylorl
Sexual morality.

Sexual morality.
(Defense Counsel):

(Objection by the prosecution for
lack of foundation) .
The Court: No.
I think we leave it
to cross-examination. 1~e feel there's
enough foundation.
I believe she can
give her opinion as to these items.

Q. (Defense Counsel):
opinion?
A.

You do have an

Yes.

The Court: As to general reputation we're
talking about.
[Note:
it is here obvious
the court is talking about general reputation
in the community as to sexual morality].
Q. (Defense Counsel):
We realize it is
your opinion and it is your own.
Kill you
tell the jury what that is, please?

A.

I'd rather not.

Mr. Boutwell (Prosecutor):
Your Honor,
she asked for her own opinion.
That is
objectionable-The Court:
Of course, that is
objectionable. We can't let her give
her own opinion relative to general
opinion.
(emphasis added).
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,
Mr. Boutwell: She's got to give
the opinion of society, not her
opinion.
The Witness: r don't know what
the opinion of society 1s. (Emphas1s added) •
(Objection by prosecutor to
strike anything she has previou&lysaid regarding her personal opinion
or the opinion of society).
The Court: The objection will have
to be sustained, if she doesn't know
what society's opinion is . . •
T. 127-129.

It is obvious from the above that the court
throughout the dialogue is referring to the general reputation
of the prosecutrix in the commumity
sexual morality (T. 127-128).

for chastity and

When the court sustains the

prosecutrix's objection to the witness testifying to
anything other than the opinion of society, the court was
referring to the opinion of the community (local society)
not society at large or society as a whole, as appellant
contends.

Furthermore, the witness most certainly could not

have given her own personal opinion

as to either what she

believed the reputation of the prosecutrix to be or what her
personal opinion was regarding the reputation of the prosecutrix
to be among the community (reputation refers to reputation
for chastity and sexual morality).

State v. Goodlife, supra,
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578 P.2d at 1291.

Had the witness stated that she knew

what the reputation of the prosecutrix for sexual morality
to be among the community (society),she could have
testified as to that.
she did

!!£!

(T. 129).

As it was, the witness stated that

know "what the opinion of society" was

Appellant attempts to show that his witness

was "misguided" as to the use of the word "society," claiming
that the witness thought the court was referring to
society as a whole as opposed to the local community.
Respondent submits that the trial court was
correct in limiting the appellant's examination into
reputation evidence.

The witness, as she responded at the

trial, testified that she had an opinion (T. 128),
regarding the reputation of the prosecutrix for sexual
morality (respondent submits that she was referring to
her own personal opinion), but answered in the negative
when asked whether she had an opinion as to the p·rosecutrix 's
reputation

for sexual morality in the community.

Thus,

no reversible error was committed by the trial court in
limiting the examination of the >vitness to her knowledge of
the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual morality in the
community.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST AND SECOND
RULINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE PERMISSIBLE
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION CONCERNING THE
PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL MORALITY WERE NOT
INCONSISTENT, CAPRICIOUS OR INHERENTLY
UNJUST.
Appellant misconstrues and misinterprets the ruling
of the trial judge when he alleges in Point III that the
court erred in allowing the appellant to examine the
prosecutrix as to any sexual preference she may have had
regarding the charge of sodomy.

The court, originally ruling

favorably on the prosecution's motion in limine by
stating that appellant's counsel could "go into her
(prosecutrix's) predisposition as to general reputation
(for sexual morality and chastity)," subsequently modified
that ruling by allowing appellant's counsel to ask the
prosecutrix as to any sexual preference she might have
regarding sodomy.

The trial court obviously felt that this

may have some bearing on the issue of consent relative to
the sodomy charge

(T. 6).

Appellant does not argue with

the later ruling, but submits that the trial court should
have also allowed examination of the prosecutrix regarding
any sexual preference she may have had regarding sexual
intercourse.

The reason for the trial court's ruling and

distinction is obvious.

Respondent submits that the court

could almost take judicial notice that most all members of
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the human race are endowed with a natural urge or tendency
at one time or another to engage in sexual intercourse with
a partner of the opposite sex.
we all have a

11

Certainly, so to speak,

sexual preference.

11

So allowing the prosecutrix

to be examined as to sexual preference regarding intercourse
on a specific occasion with other men would have nothing
whatsoever to do with whether she consented on this particular
occasion.

With regards to the sodomy charge, however, because

it is a different type of sexual act than intercourse,
perhaps not as widely preferred or accepted, it would be
relevant to the issue of consent to allow examination about
the prosecutrix's sexual tendencies or preferences towards
such a type of sexual act (relevant of course only to the
issue of consent regarding the sodomy charge).
Thus, the reason for the trial judge making such
a ruling is sound and would not have prejudiced the verdict
of the jury.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE
PROSECUTION'S MOTION IN LIMINE DID NOT
DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSOR.

Appellant claims that through the trial court's
granting of the prosecution's motion in limine, he was prevenU
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from presenting criminal evidence which with reasonable
likelihoodwouldhave altered the verdict.

~He

further

claims that such an alleged deprivation was the equivalent
of a denial of his right to confront his accusor, a right
guaranteed by both the Utah and the United States Constitutions,
both explicitly and implicitly, as part of due process.
The opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court in
State v. Herrera, supra, is instructive here.

The court

said that a defendant has no constitutional right to ask a
witness questions which are irrelevant.

The court there also

stated that "reasonable restrictions on a constitutional
right are permissible."
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court in State
v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 580 P.2d 1341 (1978), stated
that adequate safeguards provided for by statute which exist
to control the admission of testimony of prior sexual conduct
of a witness when appropriate in a particular case is not
violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In conclusion, respondent submits that the evidence
limited by the trial judge in the instant case was not relevant
to the issue of the consent, therefore not violative of any
of appellant's constitutional guarantees.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore stated, respondent
submits that the trial court was correct in granting the
prosecution's motion in limine: for none of the evidence
contended for by appellant concerning the prosecutrix was
relevant to the issue of·consent on the various charges.
Evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the
community regarding sexual morality was admissible, and
so ruled the trial court.
The decisions as to the admissibility of
evidence and the extent of cross-examination and
examination are matters which rest largely within the
discretion of the trial court.

Only if this discretion is

abused will his decisions be reversed on appeal.
Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015 (1978).

State v.

Further, even if some

was made in limiting examination or cross-examination,
appellant has not shown that such error is prejudicial,
and as such, the conviction

cannot be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for RespondEnt
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